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This letter is submitted pursuant to Rule 24(j) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
advise the Court that the United States Supreme Court has recently decided a case which may 
have significant bearing on the appeal in this matter. The case is Oraelas v. U.S., No. 95-5257 
(Argued March 26, 1996 - Decided May 28, 1996)(a copy of which is attached hereto). 
Ornelas held that "[ajppellate courts should perform de novo review of trial court 
determinations of reasonable suspicion to make stops and probable cause to make warrantless 
searches, after reviewing findings of historical fact for clear error and giving due weight to 
inferences, based on local conditions, drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law 
enforcement officers." 
If there are any questions please contact my office. Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
a 
MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS 
Attorney at Law 
MDBVbr 
^ The United States 
Law Week £$ Supreme Court '$> Opinions 
May 28, 1996 THE BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, II Volume 64, No. 45 
OPINION ANNOUNCED fyfcwr 
/ The Supreme Court decided: ^»-*^v»-
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE—Search and Seizure 
Appellate courts should perform de novo review of trial court 
determinations of reasonable suspicion to make stops and prob-
able cause to make warrantless searches, after reviewing find-
ings of historical fact for clear error and giving due weight to 
inferences, based on local conditions, drawn from those facts by 
resident judges and local law enforcement officers. (Ornelas v. 
U.S., No. 95-5257) Page 4373 
instdiK&M^Wtigageyit possible to^ Veach a correct determination 
' Se!o1r^attd«-a*^ jp^e.ther^^ of privacy is justified in the 
interest of law enforcement,'S6ST&?.-, • New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 
454, 458. However, a reviewing court should take care both to 
review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due 
weight to inferences drawn therefrom by resident judges, who view 
such facts in light of the community's distinctive features and 
events, and by local police, who view the facts through the lens of 
their experience and expertise. 
16 F. 3d 714 and 52 F. 3d 328, vacated and remanded. 
REHNQUTST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which 
STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and 
BREYER, J J., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
F u l l Tex t of O p i n i o n 
No 95-5257 
SAUL ORNELAS AND ISMAEL ORNELAS-
LEDESMA, PETITIONERS v. 
UNITED STATES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Syllabus 
No. 95-5257. Argued March 26, 1996—Decided May 28, 1996 
In denying petitioners' motion to suppress cocaine found in their car, 
the District Court ruled that the police had reasonable suspicion to 
stop and question petitioners, and probable cause to remove one of 
the interior panels where a package containing the cocaine was 
found. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed both determina-
tions, reviewing each "deferentially," and "for clear error," and 
finding no clear error in either instance. 
Held: The ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion to stop and 
probable cause to make a warrantless search should be reviewed de 
novo. The principal components of either inquiry are (1) a determi-
nation of the historical facts leading up to the stop or search, and 
(2) a decision on the mixed question of law and fact whether the 
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reason-
able police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable 
cause. Independent appellate review of the latter determination is 
consistent with the position taken by this Court, see, e.g., Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 160; will prevent unacceptably 
varied results based on the interpretation of similar facts by differ-
ent trial judges, see id., at 171; is necessary if appellate courts are 
to maintain control of, and to clarify, the pertinent legal rules, see 
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 114; and will tend to unify prece-
dent and to provide police with a denned set of rules which, in most 
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (hcadnote) will be released, as is 
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The 
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has be«n 
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See 
United Slates v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Petitioners each pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine 
with intent to distribute. They reserved their right to 
appeal the District Court's denial of their motion to 
suppress the cocaine found in their car. The District 
Court had found reasonable suspicion to stop and 
question petitioners as they entered their car, and 
probable cause to remove one of the interior panels 
where a package containing two kilos of cocaine was 
found. The Court of Appeals opined that the findings of 
reasonable suspicion to stop, and probable cause to 
search, should be reviewed "deferentially,n and "for clear 
error." We hold that the ultimate questions of reason-
able suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless 
search should be reviewed de novo. 
The facts are not disputed. In the early morning of a 
December day in 1992, Detective Michael Pautz, a 20-
year veteran of the Milwaukee County SherifFs Depart-
ment with 2 years specializing in drug enforcement, was 
conducting drug-interdiction surveillance in downtown 
Milwaukee. Pautz noticed a 1981 two-door Oldsmobile 
with California license plates in a motel parking lot. 
The car attracted Pautz's attention for two reasons: 
because older model, two-door General Motors cars are 
a favorite with drug couriers because it is easy to hide 
things in them; and because California is a "source 
State" for drugs. Detective Pautz radioed his dispatcher 
to inquire about the car's registration. The dispatcher 
informed Pautz that the owner was either Miguel 
Ledesma Ornelas or Miguel Ornelas Ledesma from San 
Jose, California; Pautz was unsure which name the 
dispatcher gave. Detective Pautz checked the motel 
registry and learned that an Ismael Ornelas accompa-
nied by a second man had registered at 4:00 a.m., 
without reservations. 
NOTICE: These opinions are subject to formal revision before publication in 
the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United Stales, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 
Section 4 Copvn&it C 1996 bv The Bureau of Natumal Affairs. Inc. 
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Pautz called for his partner, Donald Hurrle;, a detec-
tive with approximately 25 years of law enforcement 
experience, assigned for the past 6 years to the drug 
enforcement unit. When Hurrle arrived at the scene, 
the officers contacted the local .office of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and asked b E A 
personnel to run the names Miguel Ledesma Ornelas 
and Ismael Ornelas through the Narcotics and Danger-
ous Drugs Information System (NADDIS X a federal 
database of known and suspected drug traffickers. Both 
names appeared in NADDIS. The NADDIS report 
identified Miguel Ledesma Ornelas as .a heroin dealer 
from El Centro, California, and Ismael Ornelas, Jr. as 
a cocaine dealer from Tucson, Arizona. The officers then 
summoned Deputy Luedke and the department's drug-
sniffing dog, Merlin. Upon their arrival, Detective Pautz 
left for another assignment. Detective Hurrle informed 
Luedke of what they knew and together they waited. 
Sometime later, petitioners emerged from the motel 
and got into the Oldsmobile. Detective Hurrle ap-
proached the car, identified himself as a police officer, 
and inquired whether they had any illegal drugs or 
contraband. Petitioners answered "No." Hurrle then 
asked for identification and was given two California 
driver's licenses bearing the names Saul Ornelas and 
Ismael Ornelas. Hurrle asked them if he could search 
the car and petitioners consented. The men appeared 
calm, but Ismael was shaking somewhat. Deputy 
Luedke, who over the past nine years had searched 
approximately 2,000 cars for narcotics, searched the 
Oldsmobile's interior. He noticed that a panel above the 
right rear passenger armrest felt somewhat loose and 
suspected that the panel might have been removed and 
contraband hidden inside. Luedke would testify later 
tha t a screw in the door jam adjacent to the loose panel 
was rusty, which to him meant that the screw had been 
removed at some time. Luedke dismantled the panel 
and discovered two kilograms of cocaine. Petitioners 
were arrested. 
Petitioners filed pretrial motions to suppress, alleging 
tha t the police officers violated their Fourth Amendment 
rights when the officers detained them in the parking 
lot and when Deputy Luedke searched inside the panel 
without a warrant.1 The Government conceded in the 
court below that when the officers approached petition-
ers in the parking lot, a reasonable person would not 
have felt free to leave, so the encounter was an investi-
gatory stop. See 16 F. 3d 714, 716 (CA7 1994). An 
investigatory stop is permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion, Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), and a warrantless search of 
a car is valid if based on probable cause, California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565, 569-570 (1991). 
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the Magis-
t ra te Judge concluded that the circumstances gave the 
Petitioners also alleged that they had not given their consent to 
search the interior of the car. The Magistrate Judge rejected this claim, 
finding that the record "clearly established] consent to search the 
Oldsmobile" and that "neither [petitioner] placed any restrictions on the 
areas the officers could search." App. 21. The Magistrate ruled that this 
consent did not give the officers authority to search inside the panel, 
however, because under Seventh Circuit precedent the police may not 
dismantle the car body during an otherwise valid search unless the police 
have probable cause to believe the car's panels contain narcotics. See 
United States v. Garcia, 897 F. 2d 1413, 1419-1420 (1990). We assume 
correct the Circuit's limitation on the scope of consent only for purposes 
of this decision. 
officers reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause. 
The Magistrate found, as a finding of fact, that there 
was no rust on the screw and hence concluded that 
Deputy Luedke had an insufficient basis to conclude that 
drugs would be found within the panel. The Magistrate 
nonetheless recommended that the District Court deny 
the suppression motions because he thought, given the 
presence of the drug-sniffing dog, that the officers would 
have found the cocaine by lawful means eventually and 
therefore the drugs were admissible under the inevitable 
discovery doctrine. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431 
(1984). 
The District Court adopted the Magistrate's recommen-
dation with respect to reasonable suspicion, but not its 
reasoning as to probable cause. The District Court 
thought that the model, age, and source-State origin of 
the car, and the fact that two men traveling together 
checked into a motel at 4 o'clock in the morning without 
reservations, formed a drug-courier profile and that this 
profile together with the NADDIS reports gave rise to 
reasonable suspicion of drug-trafficking activity; in 
the court's view, reasonable suspicion became probable 
cause when Deputy Luedke found the loose panel. Ac-
cordingly, the court ruled that the cocaine need not be 
excluded.2 
The Court of Appeals reviewed deferentially the 
District Court's determinations of reasonable suspicion 
and probable cause; it would reverse only upon a finding 
of "clear error."3 16 F. 3d, at 719. The court found no 
clear error in the reasonable-suspicion analysis and 
affirmed that determination. Ibid. With respect to the 
probable-cause finding, however, the court remanded the 
case for a determination on whether Luedke was 
credible when testifying about the loose panel. Id., at 
721-722. 
On remand, the Magistrate Judge expressly found the 
testimony credible. The District Court accepted the 
finding, and once again ruled that probable cause 
supported the search. The Seventh Circuit held that 
determination not clearly erroneous. Judgt. order 
reported at 52 F. 3d 328 (1995). 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the 
Circuits over the applicable standard of appellate review. 
516 U. S. (1996).4 
Articulating precisely what "reasonable suspicion" and 
"probable cause" mean is not possible. They are 
commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with 
^The District Court emphasized twice that it did not reject the 
Magistrate's recommendation with respect to the inevitable discovery 
doctrine. App. 30-31, and n. 2; id, at 43-44. But on appeal the Govern-
ment did not defend the seizure on this alternative ground and the 
Seventh Circuit considered the argument waived. Id., at 71-72. 
3While the Seventh Circuit uses the term "clear error1' to denote the 
deferential standard applied when reviewing determinations of reason-
able suspicion or probable cause, we think the preferable term is "abuse 
of discretion." See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558 (1988). 
"Clear error" is a term of art derived from Rule 52(a) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and applies when reviewing questions of fact. 
4Compare, e.g., United States v. Puerta, 982 F. 2d 1297, 1300 (CA9 
1992) (de novo review); United States v. Ramos, 933 F. 2d 968,972 (CA11 
1991) {de novo review), cert, denied, 503 U. S. 908 (1992); United States 
v. Patrick, 899 F. 2d 169, 171 (CA2 1990) (de novo review) with United 
States v. Spears, 965 F. 2d 262, 268-271 (CA7 1992) (clear error). 
The United States, in accord with petitioners, contends that a de novo 
standard of review should apply to determinations of probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion. We therefore invited Peter D. IsakofT to brief and 
argue this case as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. 516 
U. S. (1996). Mr. IsakofT accepted the appointment and has well 
fulfilled his assigned responsibility. 
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" ' the factual and practical considerations of everyday life 
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal techni-
cians, ac t . " Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 231 (1983) 
(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 
(1949)); see United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7-8 
(1989). As such, the standards are "not readily, or even 
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Gates, 
supra, at 232. We have described reasonable suspicion 
simply as "a particularized and objective basis" for 
suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity, 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417-418 (1981), 
and probable cause to search as existing where the 
known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant 
a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contra-
band or evidence of a crime will be found, see Brinegar, 
supra, at 175-176; Gates, supra, at 238. We have 
cautioned that these two legal principles are not "finely-
tuned standards," comparable to the standards of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt or of proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Gates, supra, at 235. They are 
instead fluid concepts that take their substantive content 
from the particular contexts in which the standards are 
being assessed. Gates, supra, at 232; Brinegar, supra, 
at 175 ( T h e standard of proof [for probable cause] is 
. . . correlative to what must be proved"); Ker v. Califor-
nia, 374 U. S. 23, 33 (1963) ("This Courft] [has a] long-
established recognition that standards of reasonableness 
under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of 
Procrustean application"; "[e]ach case is to be decided on 
its own facts and circumstances" (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 29 (the limita-
tions imposed by the Fourth Amendment "will have to 
be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of 
individual cases"). 
The principal components of a determination of 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events 
which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and 
then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed 
from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police 
officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable 
cause. The first part of the analysis involves only a 
determination of historical facts, but the second is a 
mixed question of law and fact: "[T]he historical facts 
are admitted or established, the rule of law is undis-
puted, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the 
[relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to 
pu t ' i t another way, whether the rule of law as applied 
to the established facts is or is not violated." Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 289, n. 19 (1982). 
We think independent appellate review of these 
ult imate determinations of reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause is consistent with the position we have 
taken in past cases. We have never, when reviewing a 
probable-cause or reasonable-suspicion determination 
ourselves, expressly deferred to the trial court's determi-
nation. See, e.g., Brinegar, supra (rejecting district 
court's conclusion that the police lacked probable cause); 
Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325 (1990) (conducting 
independent review and finding reasonable suspicion). 
A policy of sweeping deference would permit, u[i]n the 
absence of any significant difference in the facts," "the 
Fourth Amendment's incidence [to] tur[n] on whether 
different trial judges draw general conclusions that 
the facts are sufficient or insufficient to constitute 
probable cause." Brinegar, supra, at 171. Such varied 
results would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary 
system of law. This, if a matter-of-course, would be 
unacceptable. 
In addition, the legal rules for probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion acquire content only through 
application. Independent review is therefore necessary 
if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to 
clarify the legal principles. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 
U. S. 104, 114 (1985) (where the "relevant legal principle 
can be given meaning only through its application to the 
particular circumstances of a case, the Court has been 
reluctant to give the trier of fact's conclusions presump-
tive force and, in so doing, strip a federal appellate 
court of its primary function as an expositor of law"). 
Finally, de novo review tends to unify precedent and 
will come closer to providing law enforcement officers 
with a defined u 'set of rules which, in most instances, 
makes it possible to reach a correct determination 
beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is 
justified in the interest of law enforcement.' " New York 
v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981); see also Thompson 
v. Keohane, 516 U. S. , (1995) (slip op., at 16) 
(u[T]he law declaration aspect of independent review 
potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and 
stabilize the law," and those effects "serve legitimate law 
enforcement interests"). 
It is true that because the mosaic which is analyzed 
for a reasonable-suspicion or probable-cause inquiry is 
multi-faceted, "one determination will seldom be a useful 
'precedent' for another," Gates, supra, at 238, n. 11. But 
there are exceptions. For instance, the circumstances in 
Brinegar, supra, and Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 
132 (1925), were so alike that we concluded that 
reversing the Circuit Court's decision in Brinegar was 
necessary to be faithful to Carroll. Brinegar, supra, at 
178 ("Nor . . . can we find in the present facts any 
substantial basis for distinguishing this case from the 
Carroll case"). We likewise recognized the similarity of 
facts in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1 (1989) 
and Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983) (in both 
cases, the defendant traveled under an assumed name; 
paid for an airline ticket in cash with a number of small 
bills; traveled from Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; 
and appeared nervous in the airport). The same was 
true both in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982) 
and California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565 (1991), see id., 
at 572 ("The facts in this case closely resemble the facts 
in Ross"); and in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 
544 (1980), and Reid v. Georgia, 448 U. S. 438 (1980), 
see id., at 443 (Powell, J., concurring) ("facts [in 
Mendenhall] [are] remarkably similar to those in the 
present case"). And even where one case may not 
squarely control another one, the two decisions when 
viewed together may usefully add to the body of law on 
the subject. 
The Court of Appeals, in adopting its deferential 
standard of review here, reasoned that de novo review 
for warrantless searches would be inconsistent with the 
"'great deference'" paid when reviewing a decision to 
issue a warrant, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 
(1983). See United States v. Spears, 965 F. 2d 262, 
269-271 (CA7 1992). We cannot agree. The Fourth 
Amendment demonstrates a "strong preference for 
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant," Gates, supra, 
at 236, and the police are more likely to use the 
warrant process if the scrutiny applied to a magistrate's 
probable-cause determination to issue a warrant is less 
than that for warrantless searches. Were we to elimi-
nate this distinction, we would eliminate the incentive. 
We therefore hold that as a general matter determina-
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be reviewed de novo on appeal Having said this, we 
hasten to point out that a reviewing court should take 
care both to review findings of historical fact only for 
clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn 
from those facts by resident judges and local law 
enforcement officers 
A trial judge views the facts of a particular case m 
light of the distinctive features and events of the 
community, likewise a police officer views the facts 
through the lens of his police experience and expertise 
The background facts provide a context for the historical 
facts, and when seen together yield inferences that 
deserve deference For example, what may not amount 
to reasonable suspicion at a motel located alongside a 
transcontinental highway at the height of the summer 
tourist season may rise to that level in December in 
Milwaukee That city is unlikely to have been an over-
night stop selected at the last minute by a traveler coming 
from California to points east The 85-mile width of Lake 
Michigan blocks any further eastward progress And while 
the city's salubrious summer climate and seasonal 
attractions bring many tourists at that time of year, the 
same is not true in December Milwaukee's average 
daily high temperature m that month is 31 degrees and 
its average daily low is 17 degrees, the percentage of 
possible sunshine is only 38 percent It is a reasonable 
inference that a Californian stopping in Milwaukee in 
December is either there to transact business or to visit 
family or friends The background facts, though rarely 
the subject of explicit findings, inform the judge's 
assessment of the historical facts 
In a similar vein, our cases have recognized that a 
police officer may draw inferences based on his own 
experience in deciding whether probable cause exists 
See, eg, United States v Ortiz, 422 U S 891, 897 
(1975) To a layman the sort of loose panel below the 
back seat arm rest in the automobile involved in this 
case may suggest only wear and tear, but to Officer 
Luedke, who had searched roughly 2,000 cars for 
narcotics, it suggested that drugs may be secreted inside 
the panel An appeals court should give due weight to 
a trial court's finding that the officer was credible and 
the inference was reasonable 
We vacate the judgments and remand the case to the 
Court of Appeals to review de novo the District Court's 
determinations that the officer had reasonable suspicion 
and probable cause in this case 
It is so ordered 
JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting 
The Court today decides that a district court's determi-
nations whether there was probable cause to justify a 
warrantless search and reasonable suspicion to make an 
investigatory stop should be reviewed de novo We have 
in the past reviewed some mixed questions of law and 
fact on a de novo basis, and others on a deferential 
basis, depending upon essentially practical consider 
ations Because, with respect to the questions at issue 
here, the purpose of the determination and its extremely 
fact-bound nature will cause de novo review to have 
relatively little benefit, it is in my view unwise to 
require courts of appeals to undertake the searching 
inquiry that standard requires I would affirm the 
itjfrmpnt nf the Court of Appeals 
As the Court recognizes, determinations of probable 
cause and reasonable suspicion involve a two-step 
process First, a court must identify all of the relevant 
historical facts known to the officer at the time of the 
stop or search, and second, it must decide whether, 
under a standard of objective reasonableness, those facts 
would give rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying a 
stop or probable cause to search See ante, at 6 -^7 
Because this second step requires application of an 
objective legal standard to the facts, it is properly 
characterized as a mixed question of law and fact See 
ante, at 7, Pullman-Standard v Swmt, 456 U S 273, 
289, n 19 (1982) 
Merely labeling the issues "mixed questions," however, 
does not establish that they receive de novo review 
While it is well settled that appellate courts "accep[t] 
findings of fact that are not 'clearly erroneous' but 
decidfe] questions of law de novo," First Options of 
Chicago, Inc v Kaplan, 514 U S , (1995) (slip 
op , at 9), there is no rigid rule with respect to mixed 
questions We have said that "deferential review of 
mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when it 
appears that the district court is 'better positioned' than 
the appellate court to decide the issue m question or 
that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the 
clarity of legal doctrine" Salve Regina College v 
Russell, 499 U S 225, 233 (1991) (citing Miller v 
Fenton, 47r4 U S 104, 114 (1985)) 
These primary factors that counsel in favor of deferen-
tial review of some mixed questions of law and 
fact—expertise of the district court and lack of law-
clanfying value in the appellate decision—are ordinarily 
present with respect to determinations of reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause The factual details 
bearing upon those determinations are often numerous 
and (even when supported by uncontroverted police 
testimony) subject to credibility determinations An 
appellate court never has the benefit of the district 
court's intimate familiarity with the details of the 
case—nor the full benefit of its hearing of the live 
testimony, unless the district court makes specific 
findings on the "totality of the circumstances" bearing 
upon the stop or search As we recognized in Cooter & 
Cell v Hartrnarx Corp, 496 U S 384 (1990), a case 
holding that deferential (abuse-of discretion) review 
should be applied to a district court's Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11 determination that an attorney did 
not conduct a reasonable inquiry or entertain a "sub-
stantiated belief regarding the nonfnvolousness of the 
complaint, see id, at 393 a district court, "[fjamiliar 
with the issues and litigants is better situated than 
the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts and 
apply the fact-dependent legal standard " Id , at 
402 
Moreover, as the Court acknowledges, "reasonable 
suspicion" and "probable cause" are "commonsense, 
nontechnical conceptions that deal with ' "the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
a c t " ' " Ante, at 5-6 (quoting Illinois v Gates, 462 U S 
213, 231 (1983) (quoting Bnnegar v United States, 338 
U S 160, 176 (1949))) Where a trial court makes such 
commonsense determinations based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is ordinarily accorded deference What 
we said in a case concerning the question whether 
certain payments were a "gift" excludable from income 
under the Internal Revenue Code, is equally pertinent 
here 
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"Decision of the issue presented in these cases must 
be based ultimately on the application of the fact-
finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of 
human conduct to the totality of the facts of each 
case. The nontechnical nature of the . . . standard, 
the close relationship of it to the data of practical 
human experience, and the multiplicity of relevant 
factual elements, with their various combinations, 
creating the necessity of ascribing the proper force 
to each, confirm us in our conclusion that primary 
weight in this area must be given to the conclusions 
of the trier of fact." Commissioner v. Duberstein, 
363 U. S. 278, 289 (1960). 
With respect to the second factor counseling in favor of 
deferential review, level of law-clarifying value in the 
appellate decision: Law clarification requires generaliza-
tion, and some issues lend themselves to generalization 
much more than others. Thus, in Pierce v. Underwood, 
487 U. S. 552, 562 (1988), a principal basis for our 
applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to a district 
court's determination that the United States' litigating 
position was "substantially justified" within the meaning 
of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U. S. C. §2412(d), 
was that the question was "a multifarious and novel 
question, little susceptible, for the time being at least, 
of useful generalization." Ibid. Probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion determinations are similarly 
resistant to generalization. As the Court recognizes, 
these are "fluid concepts," a 'not readily, or even usefully, 
reduced to a neat set of legal rules'"; and "because the 
mosaic which is analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion or 
probable-cause inquiry is multifaceted, 'one determina-
tion will seldom be a useful "precedent" for another.'" 
Ante, at 6, 8 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 232, 
238, n. 11). The Court maintains that there will be 
exceptions to this—that fact-patterns will occasionally 
repeat themselves, so that a prior de novo appellate 
decision will provide useful guidance in a similar case. 
Ante, at 8-9. I do not dispute that, but I do not 
understand why we should allow the exception to frame 
the rule. Here, as in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 
U. S. 564, 574-575 (1985), "[duplication of the trial 
judge's efforts in the court of appeals would very likely 
contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact de-
termination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial 
resources." 
The facts of this very case illustrate the futility of 
attempting to craft useful precedent from the fact-
intensive review demanded by determinations of proba-
ble cause and reasonable suspicion. On remand, in 
conducting de novo review, the Seventh Circuit might 
consider, inter alia, the following factors relevant to its 
determination whether there was probable cause to 
conduct a warrantless search and reasonable suspicion 
justifying the investigatory stop: (i) the two NADDIS 
tips; (ii) that the car was a 1981 two-door General 
Motors product; (iii) that the car was from California, a 
source state; (iv) that the car was in Milwaukee; (v) that 
it was December; (vi) that one suspect checked into the 
hotel at 4 a.m.; (vii) that he did not have reservations; 
(viii) that he had one traveling companion; (ix) that one 
suspect appeared calm but shaking; and (x) that there 
was a loose panel in the car door. If the Seventh 
Circuit were to find that this unique confluence of 
factors supported probable cause and reasonable suspi-
cion, the absence of any one of these factors in the next 
- -U — j « ^ +v»^  nro^AHpnt inapplicable. 
Of course, even when all of the factors are replicated, 
use of a de novo standard as opposed to a deferential 
standard will provide greater clarity only where the 
latter would not suffice to set the trial court's conclusion 
aside. For where the appellate court holds, on the basis 
of deferential review, tha t it was reversible error for a 
district court to find probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion in light of certain facts, it advances the clarity 
of the law just as much as if it had reversed the district 
court after conducting plenary review. 
In the present case, an additional factor counseling 
against de novo review must be mentioned: The prime 
benefit of de novo appellate review in criminal cases is, 
of course, to prevent a miscarriage of justice that might 
result from permitting the verdict of guilty to rest upon 
the legal determinations of a single judge. But the issue 
in these probable-cause and reasonable-suspicion cases 
is not innocence but deterrence of unlawful police 
conduct. That deterrence will not be at all lessened if 
the trial judge's determination, right or wrong, is 
subjected to only deferential review. 
The Court is wrong in its assertion, ante, at 9, that 
unless there is a dual standard of review—deferential 
review of a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant, and 
de novo review of a district court's ex post facto approval 
of a warrantless search—the incentive to obtain a 
warrant would be eliminated. In United States v. Leon, 
468 U. S. 897, 913 (1984), we held that "reliable 
physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on 
a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate 
. . . should be admissible in the prosecutor's case in 
chief." Only a warrant can provide this assurance that 
the fruits of even a technically improper search will be 
admissible. Law enforcement officers would still have 
ample incentive to proceed by warrant. 
Finally, I must observe that the Court does not appear 
to have the courage of its conclusions. In an apparent 
effort to reduce the unproductive burden today's decision 
imposes upon appellate courts, or perhaps to salvage 
some of the trial court's superior familiarity with the 
facts that it has cast aside, the Court suggests that an 
appellate court should give "due weight" to a trial 
court's finding that an officer's inference of wrongdoing 
(i.e., his assessment of probable cause to search), was 
reasonable. Ante, at 10. The Court cannot have it 
both ways. This finding of "reasonableness" is precisely 
what it has told us the appellate court must review de 
novo; and in de novo review, the "weight due" to a trial 
court's finding is zero. In the last analysis, there-
fore, the Court's opinion seems to me not only wrong but 
contradictory. 
* * * 
I would affirm the judgment of the Seventh Circuit on 
the ground tha t it correctly applied a deferential 
standard of review to the District Court's findings of 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion. 
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